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Tangles
A new paradigm for clusters and types
Reinhard Diestel
Traditional clustering identifies groups of objects that share certain qualities.
Tangles do the converse: they identify groups of qualities that often occur
together. They can thereby discover, relate, and structure types: of behaviour,
political views, texts, or viruses.
Tangles offer a new, quantitative, paradigm for grouping phenomena rather
than things. They can identify key phenomena that allow predictions of others.
Tangles also offer a new paradigm for clustering in large data sets.
The mathematical theory of tangles has its origins in the connectivity
theory of graphs [5], which it has transformed over the past 30 years. It has
recently been axiomatized in a way that makes it applicable to a wide range of
contexts outside mathematics [2].
This ArXiv post is a first draft of the introductory chapter of a book
I am planning to write about such application of tangles [3]. I am making it
available here as an early reference for papers on tangle applications written
in the meantime. As the idea of using tangles in this way is new, such papers
would normally require extensive introductory sections just about these fun-
damental ideas. My hope is that, by making a generic introduction available
here, authors can then build on it and concentrate in their own introductory
sections on what is specific in their application.
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Three gentle introductions, and the notion of a tangle
1. The idea behind tangles
This chapter offers three introductions to the concept and purpose of tangles.
These introductions can be read independently, and readers may choose any
one of them as an entry point to this book, according to their own background.
However as all three introductions illuminate the same concept, readers
from any background are likely also to benefit from the other two viewpoints.
Indeed, while each of them may seem plausible enough on its own, they are
rather different. The fact that they nevertheless describe the same concept,
that of a tangle, illustrates better than any abstract discussion the breadth of
this concept and its potential applications, including in fields not even touched
upon here. Moreover, even in a given context where one of the three viewpoints
seems more fitting than the other two, switching to one of those deliberately
for a moment is likely to add insight that would otherwise be easy to miss.
1.1. Tangles in the natural sciences
Suppose we are trying to establish the common cause of some set of similar
phenomena. To facilitate this, we may design a series of measurements to test
various different aspects of each of these phenomena.
If we already have an overview of all the potential causes, we might try
to design these measurements so that every potential cause results in some
expected reading for each measurement and different potential causes differ in
at least one measurement. Then only the true cause would be compatible with
all the readings we get from our measurements.
In our less-than-ideal world, it may not quite work like this. For a start,
we might simply not be aware of all the potential causes – not to mention the
fundamental issue of what, if anything, is a ‘cause’. Similar phenomena may
have different causes. Our potential causes may not be mutually exclusive, in
which case we will not be able to design experiments that will exclude all but
one of them with certainty. And finally, measurements may be corrupted, but
we may not know which ones were.
We usually try to compensate for this by building in some redundancy:
perhaps by taking more measurements, or by measuring more different aspects.
Or we might resign ourselves to making claims only in probability – which
will protect us from being disproved by any single event, but which may also
increase immensely the overheads needed to justify precise quantitative asser-
tions (of probabilities).
Tangles offer a structural, rather than probabilistic, way to afford the
redundancy needed in such cases, to do so in a particularly economical
way, and to sidestep the philosophical issue of what constitutes a cause.
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In our example, a tangle would be a hypothetical collection of readings for
all the measurements taken, a set of one possible reading per measurement. It
would not be just any such collection, but one that is ‘typical’ for the actual
collections of readings we got from the phenomena we measured, in one of two
ways to be described in a moment.1 It may happen that one, or several, of our
phenomena produced exactly this set of readings, but it can also happen that
an ‘abstract’ set of readings is typical, and hence a tangle, for our collection of
phenomena without occurring exactly in any one of them.
Our measurements might yield a single tangle, or several, or none. Given
any one of them, we may try find a common cause for this typical set of readings,
or choose not to try. If there is a common cause for many of the phenomena
investigated, it will show up as a tangle and can thus be identified.
But there can also be tangles that cannot – or not yet – be ‘explained’ by a
common cause. Such tangles are just as substantial, and potentially useful, as
those that can be labelled by a known common cause; indeed perhaps more so,
since the absence of an obvious common cause may have left them unidentified
in the past. In this sense, identifying tangles in large sets of phenomena can lead
to the discovery of new meta-phenomena that had previously gone unnoticed
and might, henceforth, be interpreted as a ‘cause’ for the group of phenomena
that gave rise to this tangle.
So when is a set τ of hypothetical measurement readings deemed ‘typical’
for the actual measurements of our phenomena, and therefore a tangle? There
are two notions of ‘typical’ that are important in tangle theory: a strong one
that is satisfied by most tangles but not required in their definition, and a
weaker one that is required in their definition, and which suffices to establish
the main theorems about tangles.
The strong notion, which we might call popularity-based , is that our set of
phenomena has a subset X (not too small) such that, for every measurement
taken, at least 80% of the phenomena in X give the reading laid down in τ .2
Note that these will be different sets of 80% of X for different measurements:
every phenomenon, even in X, may for some measurements produce a read-
ing different from the reading that τ prescribes for that measurement. Clearly,
there can be several such tangles τ , witnessed by different sets X of phenomena.
The weaker notion of when our set τ of readings is ‘typical’, and hence
constitutes a tangle, might be called consistency-based . It says that for every
small set of up to three measurements there should be a few phenomena, at
least n, say, that gave the reading specified by τ for these three measurements.
In particular, no subset σ of up to three elements of τ proves τ to be ‘incon-
sistent’ in that none of the phenomena we investigated produced exactly the
readings in σ.3 Note that if τ is typical in the popularity-based sense it will
1 Recall that we performed the same measurements on each of the phenomena we are
investigating, so we have one set of readings for each phenomenon.
2 Thus, our fixed abstract collection τ of hypothetical measurement readings is ‘popular’
with the elements of X.
3 Three readings that are inconsistent in the usual sense that they cannot occur together,
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also be typical in the consistency-based sense,4 but not conversely.
Note that both these notions of ‘typical’ are robust against small changes
in our set of data. This makes tangles well suited to ‘fuzzy’ data with the kind
of imperfections indicated earlier.
1.2. Tangles in the social sciences
Suppose we run a survey S of fifty political questions on a population P of a
thousand people. If there exists a group of, say, a hundred like-minded people
among these, there will be a ‘typical’ way of answering the questions in S in
the way most of those people would. Quantitatively, there will exist a subset X
of P , not too small, and an assignment τ of answers to all the questions in S
such that, for most questions s ∈ S, some 80% (say) of the people in X agree
with the answer to s given by τ . (Which 80% of X these are will depend on the
choice of s.) We call this collection τ of views – answers to the questions in S –
a mindset . Note that there may be more than one mindset for S, or none.
Traditionally, mindsets are found just intuitively: they are first guessed,
and only then established by quantitative evidence from surveys designed to
test them. For example, we might feel that there is a ‘socialist’ way σ of an-
swering S. To support this intuition, we might then check whether any sizable
subset X ⊆ P as above exists for this particular τ = σ.
Tangles can do the converse: they will identify both X and τ without us
having to guess them first:
Tangles offer a precise, quantitative, way to identify known mindsets
and to discover unknown ones.
For example, tangle analysis of political polls in the UK in the years well
before the Brexit referendum might have established the existence of a mindset
we might now, with hindsight, call the ‘Labour-supporting non-socialist Brexi-
teer’: a mindset whose existence few would have guessed intuitively when Brexit
was not yet on the agenda. And similarly in the US with the MAGA5 mindset
before 2016, or that of a ‘conservative Green’ in the early 1970s. Tangles can
identify previously unknown patterns of coherent views or behaviour.
1.3. Tangles in data science
One of the most basic, and at the same time most elusive, tasks in the analysis
of big data sets is clustering : given a large set of points in some space, one seeks
because they contradict each other, would be an example. But since the theory of tangles is,
and should be, independent of interpretation, we cannot take recourse to logic and have to
work with the concrete set of phenomena at hand. The reason why we work with subsets of
size up to three, rather than two, may be surprising but is immaterial at this informal level.
4 . . . as long as X is large enough that 4
10
|X| > n. Indeed, let σ consist of the results
of the measurements A,B,C laid down in τ . For each of A, B and C at most 20% of the
phenomena in X disagree with τ , so at least 100− 60 = 40 percent of X agree with τ on all
of A, B and C – which is at least n phenomena, as required.
5 Make America Great Again; Donald Trump’s 2016 presidential campaign slogan.
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to divide the set into a small number of subsets, called ‘clusters’, of points that
are in some sense similar. Similarity is usually defined in terms of a distance
function on the pairs of points, so that sets of points that are pairwise close
become a cluster.
Figure 1.1 shows a simple example of points in the plane. In the picture
on the left we can clearly see four clusters. Or can we? If a cluster is a set of
pairwise close points, and the two points shown in green in the right half of the
picture lie in the same cluster, should not the two red points – which are much
closer – lie in a common cluster too?
FIGURE 1.1. Four clusters?
For reasons such as this, and other more subtle ones, there is no universal
notion of when two points in a data set are deemed to be ‘close’. And even if
there is a consensus in a particular clustering application about such a distance
function, there are still many ways of defining clusters based on this metric –
even for such a simple setting as points in the plane.
Tangles define clusters in an entirely different manner. Not by dividing
the data set in some clever new way, but without dividing it up at all: although
there will be four tangles in our picture, these will not be defined as sets of
points. In particular, questions such as whether the green points should end
up in the same cluster but the red points, perhaps, should not, do not even
arise.
By avoiding the issue of assigning points to clusters altogether, tangles can
be precise without making arbitrary and unwarranted choices:
Tangles offer a precise, but robust, way to identify fuzzy clusters.
Rather than looking for dense clouds of data points, tangles look for the
converse: for obvious ‘bottlenecks’ at which the data set naturally splits in
half – or more precisely, into two subsets, no matter how large or small. We
call ways of splitting our data set into two disjoint subsets partitions of the set,
and the two subsets the sides of the partition.
Figure 1.2 shows three partitions of our point set at bottlenecks.6 Now,
whatever formal definition of cluster (and of bottleneck) we might choose to
6 The partition of our set at the red bottleneck, for example, has the bottom cluster on
one side and the other three clusters on the other side.
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work with, one thing will be clear: no bottleneck partition will divide any clus-
ter roughly in half, since that would violate either our definition of a cluster
of that of a bottleneck. For example, given one of the three bottlenecks in our
picture, and one of the four obvious clusters, we might argue over a few points
about whether they should count as belonging to that cluster or not, and if so
on which side of the bottleneck they lie. But for almost all the points in our
picture these questions will have a clear answer once we consider a fixed cluster
and a fixed bottleneck, no matter how loosely defined.
Put another way, whichever precise definitions we were to choose, each of
our four clusters would lie mostly on the same side of any partition at a bottle-
neck. Let us then say that the cluster orients this partition towards the side
on which most of it lies. The right picture in Figure 1.2 shows how the central
cluster, no matter how we choose to define it precisely, orients the partitions at
the three bottlenecks in this way. Each of the four clusters assigns its own set
of arrows to these same three partitions, and the central cluster orients them
all inwards.
FIGURE 1.2. Orienting the bottlenecks consistently towards the
central cluster
Note that assignments of arrows (to partitions at bottlenecks) that come
from one of the four clusters in this way are not arbitrary: the arrows are
‘consistent’ in that they all point roughly in the same way, namely, towards
that cluster.
The key idea behind tangles, now, is to keep for each cluster exactly this
information – how it orients all the bottleneck partitions – and to forget every-
thing else (such as which points belong to it). More precisely, tangles will be
defined as such abstract objects: as ‘consistent orientations of all the bottle-
neck partitions’ in a data set. In this way, tangles will extract from the various
explicit ways of defining clusters as point sets something like their common
essence. Tangles will be robust against small changes in the data, just as they
are robust against small changes in any explicit definition of point clusters we
might use to specify them. But their definition as such will be perfectly precise,
and involve no arbitrary choices of the kind one invariably has to make when
one tries to define point clusters as sets of points.
6
Of course, given a data set one has to define formally what its bottle-
neck partitions are, and when an orientation of all the bottleneck partitions is
deemed to be ‘consistent’.7 The challenge is to do all this without reference
to any perceived cluster, however vaguely defined: we can only define clusters
indirectly as tangles, as is our aim, if our definition of a tangle – and in par-
ticular our definition of consistency – does not itself refer to explicit clusters
given as point sets.8
To make the problem a little clearer, let us look at a slightly modified
example. Figure 1.3 again shows four clusters and three bottlenecks. But this
time one of the bottlenecks has an elongated shape, like a handle. The points
in this handle do not really belong to any cluster – or, if we insist on assigning
every point to some cluster, there are two clusters to which they might be
assigned, with equally reasonable justification. The example further illustrates
that, even for reasonable definitions of ‘bottleneck’ (which should include the
handle) there may well be several partitions ‘at’ the same bottleneck.9
FIGURE 1.3. Three bottlenecks, but many bottleneck partitions.
The central cluster orients them all consistently.
Now if clusters are going to be tangles, and tangles are to be consistent
orientations of all the bottleneck partitions, then our intuition that we want
there to be only four clusters in Figure 1.3 dictates that only four of the many
ways of orienting all its bottleneck partitions – one for every desired cluster –
should count as ‘consistent’. In the picture this can be achieved if, and only if,
we can ensure that consistent orientations of partitions at the same bottleneck
7 For example, orienting the three bottleneck partitions in Figure 1.2 outwards should be
‘inconsistent’, as the arrows would point away from each other.
8 In discussing our example, so far, we did the converse: we assumed we knew roughly
what the clusters should be, we thought of a bottleneck as a place at which we could partition
our big set without cutting right through any big cluster, and we defined the consistency of
arrows at bottlenecks by reference to those clusters, as pointing towards them. This was fine
for the purpose of motivating the concept of tangles: after all, in cases where we feel we know
roughly what the clusters should be, tangles should identify precisely these. But once we
get serious about defining tangles formally, we must no longer appeal to pictures or intuitive
examples.
9 This is the same problem in disguise, that of assigning points to sets: since a partition
is a pair of sets, changing these sets even slightly will give us a different partition. Ideally, we
would like there to be only one partition at each bottleneck. But since there is no canonical
way to choose one from the many candidates, we have to admit them all at this stage.
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always point the same way. Indeed, in this case consistent orientations of the
(many) bottleneck partitions will induce orientations of the (few) bottlenecks
themselves, which intuitively is our aim.
In our example, the orientations of bottleneck partitions induced by one
of the four ‘obvious’ clusters satisfy this nicely: any given cluster will either lie
mostly on the left of every partition at the handle, or mostly on the right of
every partition at the handle. Hence, the arrows defined at these partitions by
any of our four clusters will either all point to the left, or they will all point to
the right, and thus be intuitively consistent.
The challenge remains to come up with a formal definition of consistency
as the basis for our notion of tangle that bears this out: one that does not refer
to any perceived clusters, but which in the above example will orient all the
partitions at the handle in the same direction. Chapter 2 shows how this can
be done.10
Once that is achieved, we shall have a definition of tangle which, while
being entirely formal and precise, will be able to capture ‘fuzzy’ clusters in a
robust way that does not require us to allocate points to clusters.
2. The notion of a tangle
Consider a collection V of objects and a set ~S of features11 that each of the
objects in V may have or fail to have. Given such a (potential) feature →s ∈ ~S,
we denote its negation by ←s . The pair {→s , ←s } of the feature together with its
negation is then denoted by s, and the set of all these s is denoted by S.
For example, if V is a set of pieces of furniture, then →s might be the feature
of being made of wood. Then ←s would be the feature of being made of any
other material, or a combination of materials, and s could be thought of as the
question of whether or not a given element of V is made of wood.
In the language of Chapter 1.1 the elements of V would be the phenomena
investigated. The s ∈ S would be the measurements performed on these phe-
nomena, with two possible outcomes →s and ←s (called ‘readings’ in Chapter 1.1).
In the example of Chapter 1.2, the set V would be the population P of
people polled by our survey S, which for simplicity we assume to consist of
yes/no questions. Then { →s | s ∈ S } might be the set of ‘yes’ answers to the
questions in S, while ←s would denote the ‘no’ answer to the question s.
In the clustering scenario of Chapter 1.3, the set V would be the set of
points in which we look for clusters. If we equate a feature →s with the set of
objects in V that have it, then →s and ←s form a partition of V, the partition
s = {→s , ←s }. We may think of S as the set of those partitions of V that are
particularly natural, its ‘bottleneck’ partitions.
10 The term ‘consistency’ will be given a slightly narrower meaning there than in the
present discussion. But tangles will be orientations of all the ‘bottleneck’ partitions that are
consistent in our stronger sense here; such orientations will be called ‘typical’ in Chapter 2.
11 Logicians may prefer to say ‘predicates’ instead of ‘features’ here. That would be correct,
but I am trying to avoid any (false) impression of formal precision at this stage.
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2.1 Features that often occur together
Tangles are a way to formalize the notion that some features typically occur to-
gether. They offer a formal way of identifying such groups of ‘typical’ features,
each ‘type’ giving rise to a separate tangle.
In order to identify a collection of features as ‘typical’, it is not necessary
to precisely delineate a corresponding set of objects (elements of V ) that have
precisely, or even mostly, these features. This reflects most real-world examples,
where these sets are at best ‘fuzzy’. By working directly on the level of features
rather than the level of objects, tangles can be completely precise even when
the objects whose features they capture cannot be clearly delineated from each
other. This is a particular strength of tangle theory compared with traditional
clustering methods.
Let us return to the example where V is a set of pieces of furniture. Our
list ~S of possible features (including their negations) consists of qualities such
as colour, material, the number of legs, intended function, and so on – perhaps
a hundred or so potential features. The idea of tangles is that, even though ~S
may be quite large, its elements may combine into groups that correspond to
just a few types of furniture as we know them: chairs, tables, beds and so on.
The important thing is that tangles can identify such types without any
prior intuition: if we are told that a container V full of furniture is waiting for
us at customs in the harbour, and all we have is a list of items v identified only
by numbers together with, for each number, a list of which of our 100 features
this item has, our computer – if it knows tangles – may be able to tell us that
our delivery contains furniture of just a few types: types that we (but not our
computer) might identify as chairs, tables and beds, perhaps with the tables
splitting into dining tables and desks.
In the language of Chapter 1.1, these types would correlate with the dif-
ferent possible ‘causes’ for objects to be furniture: our need to sit, sleep, use
computers and so on. In the example of Chapter 1.2, they would be mindsets.
In the setting of Chapter 1.3, the sets of chairs, tables and beds would form
clusters in V. These clusters might not be clearly delineated – for example, if
our delivery contains a deckchair – but the types, groups of features that often
occur together, would be precisely defined.
In the remainder of this chapter we shall not always make explicit reference
to the three example scenarios from Chapter 1. But readers are encouraged to
check for themselves what the various new terms mean in each of those contexts,
to keep all three aspects alive as they build their intuition for tangles.
2.2 Consistency of features
To illustrate how our computer may be able to identify types of furniture from
those feature lists without understanding them, let us briefly consider the in-
verse question: starting from a known type of furniture, such as chairs, how
might this type be identifiable from the data if it was not known?
A possible answer, which will lead straight to the concept of tangles, is as
follows. Each individual piece of furniture in our unknown delivery, v ∈ V say,
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has some of the features from our list ~S but not others. It thereby specifies
the elements s of S: as →s if it has the feature →s , and as ←s otherwise. We say
that every v ∈ V defines a specification of S, a choice for each s ∈ S of either
→s or ←s but not both. We shall denote this specification of S as
v(S) := { v(s) | s ∈ S },
where v(s) := →s if v specifies s as →s and v(s) := ←s if v specifies s as ←s .
Conversely, does every specification of S come from some v ∈ V in this way?
Certainly not: there will be no object in our delivery that is both made entirely
of wood and also made entirely of steel. Thus no v ∈ V will specify both r as
→r rather than ←r , and s as →s rather than ←s , when →r and →s stand for being
made of wood or steel, respectively. In plain language: no specification of S
that comes from a real piece of furniture can contain both →r and →s , because
these features are inconsistent.
Let us turn this manifestation in V of logical inconsistencies within ~S into
a definition of ‘factual’ inconsistency for specifications of S in terms of V. Let
us call a specification of S consistent if it contains no inconsistent triple, where
an inconsistent triple is a set of up to three12 features that are not found
together in any v ∈ V. Specifications of S that come from some v ∈ V are
clearly consistent. But S can have many consistent specifications that are not,
as a whole, witnessed by any v ∈ V.13
Tangles will be specifications of S with certain properties that make them
‘typical’ for V. Consistency will be a minimum requirement for this. But since
any specification of S that comes from just a single v ∈ V is already consistent,
tangles will have to satisfy more than consistency to qualify as ‘typical’ for V.
2.3 From consistency to tangles
It is one of the fortes of tangles that they allow considerable freedom in the
definition of what makes a specification of S ‘typical’ for V – freedom that can
be used to tailor tangles precisely to the intended application. We shall describe
this formally in Chapter 6. But we are already in a position to mention one of
the most common ways of defining ‘typical’, which is just a strengthening of
consistency.
12 It might seem more natural to say ‘two’ here, as in our wood/steel dichotomy above.
Our definition of consistency is a little more stringent, because the mathematics behind
tangles requires it. Note that, formally, the elements of an inconsistent ‘triple’ need not be
distinct; an ‘inconsistent pair’ of two features →r , →s not shared by any v ∈ V, for example,
also counts as an ‘inconsistent triple’, the triple {→r , →r , →s } = {→r , →s }.
13 Here is a simple example. Suppose some of our furniture is made of wood, some of steel,
some of wicker, and some of plastic. Denote these features as →p , →q , →r , →s , respectively, and
assume that S = {p, q, r, s}. Then the specification τ = {←p , ←q , ←r , ←s } of S is consistent,
because for any three of its elements there are some items in V that have none of the three
corresponding features: those that have the fourth. But no item fails to have all four of these
features. So the consistent specification τ of S does not come from any one v ∈ V. We shall
get back to this example in Chapter 6.5.
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To get a prior feel for our (forthcoming) formal definition of ‘typical’,
consider the specification of S in our furniture example that is determined by
an ‘ideal chair’ plucked straight from the Platonic heaven: let us specify each
s ∈ S as →s if this imagined ideal chair has the feature →s , and as ←s if not.14
This can be done independently of our delivery V, just from our intuitive notion
of what chairs are. But if our delivery has a sizable portion of chairs in it, then
this phantom specification of S that describes our ideal chair has something to
do with V after all.
Indeed, for every triple →r , →s ,
→
t of features of our ideal chair there will be a
few elements of V, at least n say, that share these three features. For example,
if →r , →s ,
→
t stand for having four legs, a flat central surface, and a near-vertical
surface, respectively, there will be – among the many chairs in V which we
assume to exist – a few that have four legs and a flat seating surface and a
nearly vertical back.
By contrast, if we pick twenty rather than three features of our ideal chair
there may be no v ∈ V that has all of those, even though there are plenty of
chairs in V. But for every choice of three features there will be several – though
which these are will depend on which three features of our ideal chair we have
in mind.
Simple though it may seem, it turns out that for most furniture deliveries
and reasonable lists S of potential features this formal criterion for ‘typical’
distinguishes those specifications of S that describe genuine types of furniture
from most of its other specifications.15 But in identifying such specifications as
‘types’ we made no appeal to our intuition, or to the meaning of their features.16
So let us make this property of specifications of S that describe ‘ideal’
chairs, tables or beds into our formal, if still ad-hoc, definition of ‘typical’: let
us call a specification τ of S typical for V if for every set R of at most three
elements of S there are at least n elements v of V that specify R as τ does, i.e.,
for which v(R) = τ(R). (The integer n here is a fixed parameter on which our
notion of ‘typical’ depends, and which we are free to choose.)
Crucially, this definition of ‘typical’ is purely intrinsic: it depends on V,
but it makes no reference to what a typical specification of S ‘is typical of’.
Specifications of ideal chairs, tables or beds are all typical in this sense: they
all satisfy the same one definition.
14 Let us ignore for the moment the possibility that the ‘question’ s may not have a clear
answer for chairs, as would be the case, say, for questions of colour rather than function.
This is an issue we shall have to deal with, but which tangles can indeed deal with easily.
15 . . . of which there are many: if S has 100 elements, there are 2100 specifications of S.
16 This is not to say that the use of tangles is free of all preconceptions, biases etc. For
example, the choice of a survey S in the scenario from Chapter 1.2 is as loaded or neutral
as is would be in any other study that starts with a survey. The statement above is meant
relative to the given S once chosen. In Chapter 6 we shall discuss how the deliberate use
of preconceptions, e.g. by declaring some questions in S as more fundamental than others,
can help to improve tangles based on such preconceptions. We shall also see how to do the
opposite: how to find tangles that arise naturally from the raw data of S and V, without any
further interference from ourselves.
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Equally crucially, a specification of S can be typical for V even if V has no
element that has all its features at once. Thus, we have a valid and meaningful
formal definition of an ‘ideal something’ even when such a thing does not exist
in the real world, let alone in V.
Relative to the definition of ‘typical’ we can now define tangles informally:
A tangle of S is any specification of S that is typical for V.
Since our ad-hoc definition of ‘typical’ is phrased in terms of small subsets
of ~S, sets of size at most 3 (of which there are not so many), we can compute
tangles without having to guess them first. In particular, we can compute
tangles of S even when V is ‘known’ only in the mechanical sense of data being
available (but not necessarily understood), and S is a set of potential features
that are known, or assumed, to be relevant but whose relationships to each
other are unknown.
Tangles therefore enable us to find even previously unknown ‘types’ in
the data to be analysed: combinations of features that occur together signifi-
cantly more often than others. This was important in all three of the scenarios
from Chapter 1: tangles can identify previously unknown causes, mindsets, or
clusters.
2.4 Witnessing sets and functions
When we just defined a tangle of S as any specification τ of S that is typical
for V, we were assuming a notion of ‘typical’ that we called consistency-based
in Chapter 1.1: for every set R of up to three elements of S there should be at
least n elements of V that specify R as τ does, for some fixed integer n. This
notion of a tangle will form the basis for the tangle theory developed later.
In Chapter 1.1 we also discussed another possible notion of ‘typical’, which
we called popularity-based . This was that V has a subset X, not too small, in
which τ is ‘popular’ in that for every s ∈ S some 80% of the elements of X
specify s as τ does. We saw that, if X is big enough relative to n, then this
implies that τ is typical also in the earlier sense, and hence is a tangle. We
may thus think of X as ‘witnessing’ this.
In our furniture example, the tangle of being a chair will be witnessed by
the set X of chairs in V : every individual feature of our ‘ideal chair’ τ will be
shared by some 80% of all the chairs in V, though not all by the same 80%.
Such witnessing sets were also used in Chapter 1.2, where we defined a mindset
as a collection of views established by a political survey S that where ‘often
held together’, in exactly this sense.
Formally, let us say that a set X ⊆ V witnesses a specification τ of S if,
for every s ∈ S, there are more v in X that specify s as τ does than there
are v ∈ X that specify s in the opposite way. If these majorities are greater
than 2/3, then τ will be a tangle as defined in Section 2.3, at least for n = 1,
no matter how large or small X is.
More generally, let us say that a ‘weight’ function w:V→N witnesses τ
if, for every s ∈ S, the collective weight of the v ∈ V that specify s as τ does
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exceeds the collective weight of the v ∈ V that specify s in the opposite way.17
Much of the attraction and usefulness of tangles stems from the fact that,
in practice, most of them have such witnessing sets or functions [4]. But it is
important to remember that the definition of a tangle, be it our preliminary
definition from Section 2.3 or the formal one given later, does not require that
such sets or functions exist. It relies only on notions of consistency and of
type, which are both defined by banning triples in ~S deemed ‘inconsistent’ or
‘atypical’ from occuring together in a tangle. So far, both these were defined
with reference to the values of v(S) for v ∈ V, and being typical was simply a
strengthening of consistency.
In some contexts, however, tangles of S can be defined without any refer-
ence to V at all. In our furniture example we could have defined the consistency
of a set of features, or predicates, about the elements of V in purely logical or
linguistic terms that make no appeal to V. Indeed if →r stands for ‘made en-
tirely of wood’ and →s stands for ‘made entirely of steel’, then the set {→r , →s }
is inconsistent. The reason we chose to give was that no object in V is made
entirely of wood and also made entirely of steel. But we might have said instead
that these two predicates are logically inconsistent – which implies that there
is no such object in V but which can be established without examining V.
The way consistency and type are defined formally [1] as part of the notion
of abstract tangles is something half-way between these two options: it makes
no reference to V but refers only to some axiomatic properties of ~S which reflect
our notion that ~S is a set of ‘features’. In this way it also avoids any appeal to
logic or meaning.
For the rest of this book the only important thing to note about witnessing
sets or functions is that while many tangles have them, tangles can be identified,
distinguished, or ruled out without any reference to such sets or functions. The
mindset of being socialist can be identified without having to find any actual
socialists, let alone delineating these as a social group against others.
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